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DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE 
IN THE FRANCHISING SECTOR: 
INSIGHTS FROM FRENCH FRANCHISORS' WEBSITES 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) within the 
franchising sector. More specifically, a set of research hypotheses derived from Regulation 
Theory and Transaction Cost Analysis addresses the relationships first between the chain size 
and the extent of corporate social disclosure (CSD) on franchisors' websites, and then between 
the percentage of company-owned units within the chain and the extent of corporate social 
disclosure (CSD) on franchisors' websites. The empirical study encompasses a total of 136 
French franchise chains. Findings reveal that 86.03% of these franchisors communicate about 
their CSR activities on their website.  Moreover,  a significant relationship exists  between 
chain size (respectively, the percentage of company-owned units within the chain) and the 
extent of CSD provided on franchisors' websites. 
Keywords 
Franchising, Corporate social responsibility, Corporate social disclosure, Chain size, 
Percentage of company-owned units.   3 
Introduction 
Over the past few years, sustainable development and corporate social practices have 
become major concerns among all economic actors. An increasing number of companies are 
publishing various kinds of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports (KPMG 2008). CSR 
measures "the firm's consideration of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, 
technical and legal requirements of the firm [to] accomplish social benefits along with the 
traditional economic gains which the firm seeks" (Davis 1973, p. 312). Topics relative to CSR 
have been explored in detail in many industries such as banking (Zeghal and Ahmed 1990), 
petroleum (Ness and Mirza 1991; Patten 1991; Zeghal and Ahmed 1990) and steel (Déjean 
and Oxibar 2010; Guthrie and Parker 1989). Nevertheless, CSR has not been examined in 
depth in the franchising sector, except for two papers published in the proceedings of the 
International Society of Franchising  conference,  namely  Kaufmann  et al.  (2008) and 
Ehrmann and Meiseberg (2011). 
A research stream has focused on the motivations leading companies to disclose social 
and environmental information, and the scope of this research includes the processes  for 
reporting on environmental and social impacts. Most studies use corporate social disclosure 
(CSD) as a proxy for activity in the area of social and environmental responsibility. Such 
studies are based on the assumption that the level of CSD is correlated with the company's 
socially responsible behavior (Cowen et al. 1987; Roberts 1992; Ullmann 1985). Ullmann 
(1985, p. 543) indicates that “social performance refers to the extent to which an organization 
meets the needs, expectations, and demands of certain external constituencies beyond those 
directly linked to the company's products/markets”. He hypothesizes a positive relationship 
between the quantity and quality of a firm's social disclosure and its social performance. In 
other words, this approach considers a high volume of CSD to reflect a high level of CSR.   4 
The demand for CSD is presumed to have arisen, to a large extent, from the need for greater 
information expressed by corporate shareholders. This trend became more pronounced once 
the environmental and social impacts of business had been widely publicized, along with 
recognition of the potential for these impacts to affect corporate performance. The 
determinants behind the decision to disclose social information, which remains a voluntary 
decision in most countries, are considered to revolve around a company's desire to meet this 
disclosure  demand. Other goals accomplished as part of such a step include: reducing 
information asymmetry between the company and its  market;  supporting the company's 
commitment to sustainability activities; managing the risks related to these activities; and 
building a reputation as being responsible for sustainability-related impacts. 
Various theoretical perspectives have been used to explain CSD. The theories entering 
into consideration consist for the most part of legitimacy theory (Deegan 2002; Guthrie and 
Parker 1989; Patten 1991; Woodward et al. 1996) and stakeholder theory (Deegan and Rankin 
1997; Gray et al. 1995a; Huang and Kung 2010; Roberts 1992; Tilt 1994; Ullman 1985; 
Zeghal and Ahmed 1990). Only a few researchers however have explored CSD from the 
perspective of stakeholder-agency theory, at least explicitly (Belkaoui and Karpik 1989; 
Cowen et al. 1987; Hackston and Milne 1996; Ness and Mirza 1991; Reverte 2009), even 
though this approach seems to be very fruitful for explaining CSD. The regulation theory and 
agency theory used as a basis enable, for the former, characterizing the political dimension of 
CSD and, for the latter, explaining the role of social information in managing the explicit or 
implicit contracts existing between stakeholders. 
It is of particular interest to examine CSD in the specific case of franchising, and this 
is so for several reasons. First, Combs et al. (2011, p. 117) recently called for further study on 
business ethics in franchising "to provide an ethical dimension to research on franchising".   5 
Second, the franchising sector is booming throughout  the world, in both  developed and 
emerging countries. Third, franchising covers several industries, retail ones and services ones. 
It thus makes it possible to explore CSD within various types of industrial settings. Fourth, 
CSD is tied to brand image, which proves crucial to the franchising business. Fifth and last, 
CSD in franchising, as opposed to large corporations, involves at least two kinds of 
entrepreneurs, the franchisor and the franchisee. As a result, the development of CSR 
practices in franchise chains may be more complicated than in large corporations due to the 
fact that franchisees are independent. This means that franchisors must convince franchisees 
of the relevance of this practice and utility of such investments dedicated to CSD, in addition 
to spreading the message locally. 
This paper is thus intended to answer the following research question: what are the 
determinants of CSD in the franchising sector? Both Regulation Theory and Transaction Cost 
Analysis allow formulating hypotheses on the relationships between chain size (respectively, 
the percentage of company-owned units within the chain) and the extent of CSD practices. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on franchising and 
CSD, in addition to developing the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the method and, 
more specifically, the data, variables and data analysis approaches, while Section 4 presents 
the main results. The paper's concluding section then provides a discussion of findings. 
Literature Review 
Franchising and CSD 
Even though many franchisors communicate about their CSR activities, for example 
Cartridge World,  McDonald's,  Yves Rocher, it seems that just two research papers have 
actually focused on  CSR in the special  case of franchising. Both were published in the   6 
proceedings of the International Society of Franchising conference (Ehrmann and Meiseberg 
2011; Kaufmann et al. 2008). 
On the one hand, Kaufmann et al. (2008) examined the CSR activities of a sample of 
100  franchisors in the U.S.  market. This examination identified four categories of CSR 
activities: philanthropy, sponsorship, cause marketing and volunteerism, in accordance with 
the classification by Bloom and Gundlach (2000). Kaufmann et al. (2008) found that only 
29% of the sampled franchisors were involved in some form of CSR activity. They also 
pointed out that both the number of company-owned units and total investment influenced the 
level of CSR participation. Yet they could not find any significant influence due to chain age, 
the proportion of franchised units within  the chain (versus  company-owned units)  or  the 
allowance of passive ownership on this level of CSR activity. 
On the other hand, Ehrmann and Meiseberg (2011) analyzed  the prevalence and 
performance impact of CSR in franchising by relying on a questionnaire-based approach. 
Their empirical study was founded on a sample of 76 German franchisors. Their initial set of 
results highlighted the high level of interest shown in CSR within the franchising sector. 
According to results of their empirical study, 32% of sampled franchisors considered CSR to 
be more widespread in franchising than in other business sectors. Several reasons were cited, 
namely the need to attract better franchisees coupled with the fact that certain franchisees do 
not participate in CSR activities. Moreover, these authors demonstrated that the intensity with 
which a chain embraces CSR activities depends on chain-specific factors, namely chain size, 
extent of multi-unit franchising and CSR experience. In contrast, chain performance depends 
not only on  chain-specific factors  like  CSR  intensity,  chain  size, extent of multi-unit 
franchising and chain age (negative impact), but also on certain industry and competitive 
factors, such as competitive intensity (negative impact).   7 
Our research has been based on findings from  these two previous  studies.  The 
respective  authors  have underscored the interest and relevance of studying CSR in the 
franchising sector. They insisted on the fact that their research remains exploratory. We have 
decided to pursue this direction by: 1) assessing a specific population of franchisors, namely 
members of the French Franchise Federation, as opposed to a random sample of franchisors 
or those that have accepted to complete a questionnaire; 2) classifying CSR activities into 
categories  that are different  from those adopted in these  previous studies;  3)  introducing 
additional explanatory variables, among which the industry variable (namely, retailing versus 
services) as suggested by Kaufmann et al. (2008); 4) observing CSR activities, as reflected by 
website content and not as perceived by the franchisors, along the lines of Ehrmann and 
Meiseberg (2011); 5) examining CSD over the entire website, and not just in specific areas of 
the  website, as was the case with Kaufmann  et al.  (2008); and  6) focusing on the CSR 
practices of French franchisors, in contrast with most of the previous research on franchising 
that has been devoted to the American market (Dant 2008) and in accordance with Ehrmann 
and Meiseberg (2011). 
Research hypotheses 
Franchise chain size and CSD  
Large companies are more visible to the public than smaller ones, making larger 
companies more open to scrutiny from stakeholder groups and more vulnerable to adverse 
reactions (Branco and Rodrigues 2008). According to regulation theory (Posner 1974), the 
larger a company, the more attention politicians will pay to its activities. Larger companies 
face the risk of additional costs, which generates wealth transfer due to the introduction of 
new regulations. In stakeholder-agency theory, Hill and Jones (1992) described the firm as a 
nexus of contracts between stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers and communities).   8 
These authors suggested that: "Each of these groups can be seen as supplying the firm with 
critical resources (contributions) and in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied (by 
inducements)." (Hill and Jones 1992, p. 133). 
In the same vein, after focusing on the relationship between companies and regulators 
(Epstein et al. 1976), studies in the field of CSD have broadened their scope to a variety of 
company activity observations. For Abbott and Monsen (1979, p. 508), "a large corporation 
is subject to pressure from both the public in general and government regulatory agencies in 
particular". Cooke (1992, p. 229) added that "large companies  […] receive more public 
attention than smaller-sized companies". As Hackston and Milne (1996, p. 81) argued, 
"larger companies undertake more activities, make a greater impact on society, and have 
more shareholders who might be concerned with social programs undertaken by the 
company". According to stakeholder theory, CSD can be considered as "part of the dialogue 
between the company and its stakeholders" (Gray et al. 1995a, p. 53). Social information 
disclosure constitutes a form of social reporting to groups tied to the company by implicit or 
explicit contracts (Deegan and Rankin 1997; Huang and Kung 2010; Roberts 1992; Tilt 1994; 
Ullman 1985; Zeghal and Ahmed 1990). 
In sum, companies are expected to disclose environmental and social information in 
order to reduce their political visibility and demonstrate to politicians and the public at large 
that they are implementing their social responsibilities. In this manner, they are reducing their 
political costs. Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987), as well as Cooke (1992), argued that the 
public pays more attention to larger companies, thus exposing them to a greater pressure to 
disclose social information. We can then formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: Chain size positively influences the extent of CSD on franchisors' websites. 
Organizational form of the chain and CSD   9 
According to Jones and Hill (1988, p. 160), "transaction costs are the negotiating, 
monitoring and enforcement costs that have to be borne to allow an exchange between two 
parties to take place". They added that transaction difficulties constitute the source of these 
costs (Williamson 1975). These transactional difficulties include opportunism, information 
impactedness and asset specificity. The Transaction Cost Analysis leads to predicting that 
franchisors  with  a large number of company-owned units in their chain can implement 
changes and new initiatives more easily than their counterparts with a greater number of 
franchised units. In the case of company ownership, fewer conflicts arise, making for lower 
transaction costs. 
Consequently, it appears to be easier for franchisors to implement CSR activities with 
the managers of company-owned units than with franchisees. Working with company-owned 
units also facilitates the monitoring of CSR implementation and its effects. Dant (1996, p. 55) 
asserted that the "transaction costs confronting a franchisor are affected by the level of 
transaction-specific investments made by a (potential) franchisee, the environmental/external 
uncertainty [...] and the amount of behavioral uncertainty [...] perceived by the franchisor". 
A few comments are required here. First, regarding transaction-specific investments, 
investments on the part of franchisees to relay the franchisor CSR message at the local level 
are specialized and one-time actions; they are tailored to the franchise chain with which the 
franchisee is affiliated. Second, franchisors can face external uncertainty with respect to CSR 
activities. Because the environment and effects of implementing such CSR activities are not 
always predictable, it may  be difficult to convince franchisees to undertake this kind of 
implementation. Third, behavioral uncertainty should also be mentioned. It remains uncertain 
whether franchisees will participate in CSR activities and wind up implementing them at the 
local level. Higher monitoring costs will therefore be necessary.   10 
To summarize, a high percentage of company-owned units within the chain allows the 
franchisor to more easily implement CSR activities. We can thus formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: The percentage of company-owned units within the chain positively influences the extent 
of CSD on franchisors' websites. 
Methodology 
Sample description 
The research hypotheses are tested in the French market. Franchising in France is 
especially well developed. The country accounts for 1,477 chains, 58,351 franchised stores 
and a total of €47.88 billion generated in the franchising sector (French Franchise Federation 
2011). Moreover, conducting an empirical study in the French market corresponds to the call 
issued by Dant (2008) and Dant et al. (2008), who pointed out the importance of exploring 
franchising issues in markets outside the U.S., in response to today's predominantly mono-
cultural view towards franchising research. Another justification for this focus on France is 
that French law tends to  encourage companies to disclose information on the social and 
environmental consequences of their activities (Law on NER 2001). 
Our sample consists of 136 franchise chains, all of which are members of the French 
Franchise Federation. The data stem from the directory published by this federation under the 
title: "2010 Toute la franchise, les chiffres, les textes, les réseaux". This data source displays 
the main characteristics of franchise chains present in the French market. Our sample includes 
chains from various industries, including retailing and services. This directory has already 
been used in previous research on franchising in France (for instance, Barthélemy 2008; Dant 
et al. 2008; El-Akremi et al. 2011) and has proven to be a reliable source.   11 
Characteristics of franchise chains 
Variables corresponding to franchise chain characteristics, along with descriptive 
statistics and correlation values, are presented in Table 1. 
Chain size and organizational form 
Chain size refers to the number of units, including franchised units and company-
owned units, within the French market. The average franchisor has 141.09 units located in 
France. On the other hand, the chain's organizational form is measured by the percentage of 
company-owned units within  the chain in the French market.  For this characteristic, the 
average franchisor maintains 30.12% of company-owned units within its chain. 
Control variables 
In compliance with the existing literature on franchising, we have also included chain 
age, entry fees, industry and internationalization as control variables in all regression 
analyses. Chain age is measured in years, with a mean of 18.91 years. Entry fees are measured 
in Euros. The mean entry fee is equal to €21,480.25. "Industry" refers to a dummy variable, 
coded 0 for franchisors in the retail industry and 1 for franchisors in the service industry. A 
total of 54% of the sampled franchisors run their business in the service sector. "Franchise 
chain internationalization"  also  refers to a dummy variable,  coded 0 for purely domestic 
chains and 1 for international chains
1
Insert Table 1 here 
. In fact,  68%  of franchisors have expanded into 
international activities. 
                                                 
1  Internationalization  may  be measured using  other variables, for example  the number of units in foreign 
countries, the number of countries where units are located. These data however are not available for most chains 
composing the sample, which is why we chose to introduce a dummy variable, as Perrigot et al. (forthcoming) 
recently did in their research on franchise chain internationalization.   12 
Analysis of franchisors' websites 
Rationale for choosing institutional websites as a means to study franchisors' CSR practices 
CSR occupies a "prominent position on corporate Internet sites"  (Ehrmann and 
Meiseberg 2011). In this paper, the corporate social disclosures (CSD) of franchisors are 
analyzed through detailed observations of their websites. Even though the annual report has 
frequently been used in previous studies (Epstein and Freedman 1994), Zeghal and Ahmed 
(1990) underscored the insufficiency of an annual report approach, as did Parker (1982, p. 
282), who indicated that the annual report "is inaccessible to a large majority because it fails 
to meet their information needs or because it is not easily understood by unsophisticated 
audiences". Conversely, companies consider websites as a means of communication offering 
several opportunities, in particular the ability to disseminate information in a less formal way 
while reaching an increased number of users worldwide. This  medium's  audience  size, 
efficiency and lower costs are cited as reasons to explain the growing use of this tool for 
corporate disclosures (Craven and Marston 1999; Esrock and Leichty 1998; Gowthorpe and 
Amat 1999; Hedlin 1999; Lymer 1998). Company websites, which differ from the annual 
report in terms of periodicity, quality and breadth of audience, have in fact been examined 
during previous research (Craven and Marston 1999; Lymer 1998; Williams and Ho Wern Pei 
1999). 
For our empirical study therefore, we searched the websites of all 136 franchise chains 
composing our sample using Google, in addition to checking the directory to verify that the 
URL address was the same. We focused on the institutional websites  created by the 
franchisors,  namely  those corresponding to the franchised brand, as opposed to websites 
representing the Group to which the franchise chain belongs (as an example  the Bonobo 
website was chosen and not the Beaumanoir website, despite Bonobo actually belonging to   13 
the Beaumanoir Group). The detailed analysis of franchisors' CSD on their websites was 
conducted in April and May 2010. It is important to mention here that data on franchise chain 
characteristics displayed in the 2010 franchise directory correspond to figures for year 2009. 
In accordance with previous research on CSR, this 1-year time lag serves to minimize the 
issue of endogeneity
2
Construction of a specific analysis grid 
. 
Following a seminal study by Ernst and Ernst (1978) and many subsequent studies that 
refer to their definition of social information (Gray et al. 1995b; Hackston and Milne 1996), 
we transposed and slightly adapted these CSR categories to fit the French franchising sector. 
The categories selected were:  environment, human resources, products, fair business 
practices, community involvement, ethics and others, as detailed in Table 2. Most of these 
categories  were  divided into subcategories. When information  found  on the franchisor's 
website referred to a CSR category or subcategory, we systematically incremented the value 
of the corresponding variable by one unit. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Data analysis methods 
Correlations and t-tests were used to describe franchisors' CSR activities as a function of 
their characteristics. Linear regression models were also run in order to highlight those factors 
that, when taken as a whole, predict the extent of CSD found on franchisors' websites. 
Before testing our hypotheses, we first checked for multicollinearity. The maximum 
value in the correlation matrix (see Table 1) was 0.286. Furthermore, the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) were all less than 2, thus  indicating very little likelihood of any 
                                                 
2 We would like to thank one of the reviewers for having raised this issue of endogeneity.   14 
multicollinearity on the parameter estimates (Hair et al. 2006). Hence, we cannot foresee 
multicollinearity as a problem in this dataset. We also investigated the normality of dependent 
variables from all regression models using Kurtosis, Skewness and Shapiro-Wilk W tests. The 
models proved not to be normally distributed according to the results of these tests. We 
therefore decided to use logarithms of these variables in order to account for the  non-
normality aspect (Barthélemy 2008; Sorenson and Sørensen 2001). 
Results 
Franchisor practices in terms of CSD found on websites 
In all, 117 franchisors (out of the 136 total, or 86.03%, from among French Franchise 
Federation members) share information regarding at least one CSR activity on their website. 
This high percentage underscores the importance of CSR activities within the franchising 
sector in France and suggests that communicating about CSR activities on websites, 
regardless of the actual category of CSR, has now become a common practice among French 
franchisors independently of their characteristics. It is worthwhile however to distinguish how 
franchisors  provide such communication depending on the particular category  of CSR 
activity. Towards this objective, Table 3 lists the numbers of franchisors that communicate on 
their  website  with at least one news item referring to each  particular CSR category and 
subcategory. The numbers of franchisors not engaged in such communication are shown in 
brackets. 
Insert Table 3 here   15 
Chain characteristics and the extent of CSD on franchisors' websites 
At the aggregated CSR level 
On average and aggregated across all CSR categories, a franchisor relays information 
on approximatively 21.40 CSR activities through its website (standard deviation = 37.292). 
This communication focuses primarily on products  (7.68 information items on  average), 
environment (7.65 information items) and human resources (3.44 items). 
Correlation values indicate the presence of significant relationships between chain 
characteristics and the extent of CSD on franchisors' websites (see Table 4). On the one hand, 
a significant and positive correlation exists between chain size and extent of CSD on websites 
(0.405; p < 0.001). The larger the franchise chain, the greater  the extent of franchisor 
communication about CSR activities on the website and vice versa. On the other hand, a 
significant and positive relationship also exists between the percentage of company-owned 
units within the chain and the extent of CSD on websites (0.176; p < 0.001). The higher this 
percentage, again the greater the extent of franchisor communication about CSR activities on 
the website  and  vice versa.  Moreover,  chain age and the extent of CSD on franchisors' 
websites are significantly and positively correlated (0.236; p < 0.001), whereas entry fees and 
the extent of CSD on websites are not significantly correlated. 
According to t-test results (see Table 5), no significant difference exists in terms of the 
extent of CSD on websites  between  franchise  chains in the retail industry and those  in 
services.  Yet  the extent of CSD on websites  is significantly greater  for international 
franchisors (28.03 information  items; sig < 0.001; N = 76) than for purely domestic 
franchisors (8.69 items; sig < 0.001; N = 35). 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here   16 
The linear regression model enables determining the chain characteristics that, when 
taken all together, influence the extent of CSD on franchisors' websites (see Table 6). This 
model is considered to be satisfactory (R² = 25.8%).  First, chain size significantly and 
positively influences the extent of website CSD [B = 0.004, β = 0.356, sig < 0.01], thus 
providing support for H1 at the aggregate CSR level. Second, the percentage of company-
owned units within the chain significantly and positively influences the extent of website 
CSD [B = 0.010, β = 0.243, p < 0.05]. Hence, H2 is also confirmed at the aggregate CSR 
level. As far as control variables are concerned, none exert significant influence on the extent 
of website CSD. 
Insert Table 6 
At the CSR category level 
The correlation values and t-test results have also been displayed in Tables 4 and 5. As 
for chain size, the larger the franchise chain, the greater extent of franchisor communication 
on its CSR activities tied  to  environment  (pollution, recycling, resources/energy, site 
aesthetics, certification labels and  other  accomplishments),  human resources  (training), 
products (research and development, product quality, safety), community involvement (arts, 
education, humanitarianism, health), and ethics. As for the percentage of company-owned 
units within the chain, the higher this percentage, the  greater extent of  franchisor 
communication on  the  CSR activities  tied to human resources  (health and safety, 
compensation, industrial relationships), products (safety), and community involvement (arts). 
As for control variables, relative to chain age, the older the franchise chain, the more likely 
the franchisor communicates about CSR activities tied to environment (pollution, recycling, 
certification/labels),  products  (research and development, product  quality) and community 
involvement  (arts, humanitarianism,  health). Regarding entry fees, as they increase, the   17 
franchisor becomes less likely to share its CSR activities on the website specific to products 
(research and development). For the industry variable, franchisors in the services industry on 
the whole communicate more  readily  on CSR activities than their counterparts in retail, 
although the difference is not significant. Differences prove to be significant however in the 
categories of environment (recycling and resources/energy), human resources (training) and 
products (safety). In contrast, franchisors in the services industry communicate less readily on 
their CSR activities tied to fair business practices with franchisees than retail franchisors. As 
regards the  internationalization  variable, international franchisors (an average of 28.03 
information  items) communicate significantly more on their CSR activities than purely 
domestic franchisors (8.69 items), and such  is particularly true  in the categories of 
environment  (pollution, recycling, site  aesthetics),  human resources  (training, industrial 
relationships), products (research and development, safety), fair business practices (suppliers) 
and community involvement (humanitarianism, health). 
The linear regression models enable determining the set of chain characteristics that, 
when aggregated, influence the extent of CSD on websites relative to one of the following 
categories:  environment,  human resources,  products,  fair business practices,  community 
involvement, ethics, and other CSR elements (see Table 7). The models are considered to be 
satisfactory regarding R² values. Nevertheless, the  ethics  and  other  categories cannot be 
explained due to the fact that too few franchisors actually address these categories, making it 
impossible to apply the logarithm in such cases with zero values. 
Insert Table 7 here 
Chain size significantly and positively influences the extent of CSD on franchisors' 
websites, with respect to products, fair business practices and community involvement. H1 is 
thus partially confirmed at the CSR category level. Moreover, the percentage of company-  18 
owned units within the chain significantly and positively influences the extent of CSD on 
websites, for just the category of products. H2 therefore is only partially confirmed at the 
CSR category level. As for the control variables, none significantly influence the extent of 
CSD on franchisors' websites. 
Discussion 
Summary of findings 
This empirical study has revealed that most French franchisors do disclose social and 
environmental information:  86.03%  mention at least one CSR activity  on their dedicated 
website. This percentage is much higher than that indicated by Kaufmann et al. (2008). Such 
a discrepancy can stem from different considerations: the market (France versus the U.S.), 
legislation (the French regulatory framework encourages companies to disclose social and 
environmental information), the study sample (a whole population versus a random sample), 
the year of observation (2010 versus 2007), observation methods (the entire website versus 
three specific areas). The CSR activities of French franchisors also seem to be more extensive 
than those of their German counterparts. As a case in point, Ehrmann and Meiseberg (2011) 
reported a CSR intensity of 2.46 out of 5 for the German market. For whatever the reason, 
CSD has now become common practice in the French franchising sector. The percentage 
identified in this study is comparable to that found in other sectors. For instance, Zeghal and 
Ahmed (1990) noticed that 100% of Canadian banks and petroleum companies, representing 
over 80% of these industries'  combined  assets, disclose their  environmental and social 
information. 
These  observations  of  website content reveal that many franchisors communicate 
about products, human resources and environment, yet only a few add information focusing 
more specifically on community involvement,  fair business practices  and  ethics. Product   19 
quality has always been emphasized within the marketing arena and, accordingly, companies 
always want to reassure customers of their products' quality. Training is also often mentioned 
by companies, for reasons tied to social constraints (nowhere more true than in France!). 
These aspects therefore are not very innovative. 
In addition, findings show a significant and positive relationship between chain size 
(respectively the percentage of company-owned units within the chain) and the extent of CSD 
on franchisors' websites. Hypotheses H1 and H2 have thus been confirmed at the aggregate 
CSR level. As for control variables, none exert a significant impact on the extent of CSD 
found  on  franchisors'  websites. When considering the CSR categories, a  few significant 
relationships can be detected between chain size (respectively percentage of company-owned 
units within the chain) and the extent of CSD on websites, though the existing relationships 
are positive as predicted in the research hypotheses. Control variables do not influence the 
extent of CSD on websites at the category level. 
Research contributions 
This paper has contributed to the literature on CSD through both a specific analysis 
grid and Internet support. Until recently, most researchers studying CSR have focused on the 
social information disclosed in annual reports, along with just a single category of social 
information (mostly the environment). In the present research, we have broadened  the 
categories of information observed, to encompass far more than environmental information. 
Moreover, by observing the information disclosed on websites, we have been able to take into 
account the fact that companies favor this medium for communicating with their stakeholders. 
The results of this study underscore that CSD is not a homogeneous practice, given that some 
topics are more readily disclosed by franchisors than others.    20 
In applying the Transaction Cost Analysis, this study has also contributed  to the 
literature on franchising, with an emphasis on plural form. Over the past twenty years, many 
researchers have explored the plural form phenomenon, with most of the previous research on 
this organizational form highlighting its importance and advantages for franchisors. In the 
present research, we have demonstrated that adopting a plural form to develop and manage 
the franchise chain significantly influences the extent of CSD found on franchisors' websites. 
In particular, a significant and positive relationship exists  between the percentage of 
company-owned units within the chain and the extent of CSD on websites,  both  at the 
aggregate level and for several CSR categories. Lastly, this paper has built on the findings of 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) and Ehrmann and Meiseberg (2011), who initiated CSR exploration 
in the specific context of the franchising sector and who encouraged further research on this 
topic. 
Managerial implications for franchisors and franchisees 
This study has practical implications for franchisors. The research findings can help 
existing and new franchisors understand the extent of CSR displayed in the franchising sector, 
in addition to providing an overview of all CSR categories. Though most French franchisors 
use their website to communicate on CSR practices  and though the  Web  content 
(environment, human resources, products, etc.) and extent of CSD on the websites vary from 
one chain to the next, there is still room to improve their communication and practices in the 
area of CSR. From another perspective, would-be franchisees seeking to run their business in 
an environment that favors CSR initiatives should consider joining a large franchise chain 
with a high number of company-owned units. This does not necessarily mean that small 
franchise  chains  are less socially responsible than larger ones. Franchisors  with a small   21 
number of units are perhaps  more dedicated to expanding  their  chain  first  before 
communicating on their CSR activities. 
Communicating on CSR practices is not an end in and of itself. Some franchisors 
makes use of their CSR activities for other reasons, such as: cost savings; marketing benefits; 
investor relations;  community, political and regulatory relations;  and risk reduction 
(Mandelbaum 2008). However, an overlap is required between CSR communications and the 
chain strategy and business model: "If your franchise system is a restaurant franchise, for 
example, you might consider a charitable partnership that helps with feeding the homeless. A 
children's franchise concept might want to consider raising money for a national organization 
that supports local kids who have certain illnesses" (Mailloux 2010, p. 54). Green franchisee 
conventions might also be organized by franchisors instead of organizing typical conventions 
(Masterson 2008). "Embracing and communicating a green initiative in and of itself will 
signal a move in the right direction and change the mindset and expectations of  all 
participants" (Masterson 2008, p. 76). Moreover, the possibilities of transposing the chain's 
CSR activities to the unit level must be examined. Local partnerships can in fact contribute to 
reinforcing the national or international CSR orientation, while enhancing the brand image of 
the franchised unit. From this perspective, all franchisees must be involved in the franchisor's 
CSR activities, which could entail being parts of specific CSR committees (Baugh 2010). 
Being  tied to brand image,  CSD  help  attract  not only customers but would-be 
franchisees  as well.  Social entrepreneurship is becoming increasingly  popular for both 
customers, who "feel more comfortable spending their money with a business they know is 
doing something for the greater good of the community", and would-be franchisees who "are 
looking not only for a new business, but also a way to give back to their community" 
(Mailloux 2010, p. 54). Consequently, certain concepts of social franchising are beginning to   22 
appear  and extend into various  markets, including France (for instance,  AETES 
Environnement, a chain of cleaning operations), Germany (for instance, CAP Markte, a 
supermarket  chain), Italy (for instance, Le Mat, an international hotel  chain).  Social 
franchising actually consists of applying a CSR approach to the overall social franchising 
concept and then duplicating the success derived from the first units at other locations. 
Limitations and future research leads 
This research has some limitations. First, the empirical study is based on observations 
of franchisors' websites. Even though an analysis grid was used, it could still be argued that 
subjectivity has been introduced into this study via the interpretation of CSR information. In 
order to minimize research bias, we initiated the observation together, by comparing each 
individual observation to that of the other authors, for the purpose of harmonizing our website 
observation  process. Screen captures  of all websites  were also produced.  Moreover,  this 
approach only provided a snapshot in time of CSR practices among French franchisors. CSD 
likely evolved over the course of the observation period. A longitudinal approach spanning 
several weeks (or months or years) would help guide our efforts in examining CSD within the 
franchising sector as a process. Lastly, franchisors' websites offer a means of communication 
for  attracting  customers and would-be franchisees. CSR activities as displayed on the 
websites  can then appear as "greenwashing"  in comparison with  the  day-to-day  life of 
franchise chain members. 
Second, the research has been limited to the French market. The selection of this 
specific market, which by the way boasts a very healthy and dynamic franchising sector, is 
consistent with the recommendations issued by Dant (2008) and Dant et al. (2008), who cited 
the importance of  studying  franchising issues in markets outside  the U.S. These authors 
pointed out today's predominantly  mono-cultural view towards franchising research.   23 
Nevertheless, an exploration of CSR practices in other contexts with varying CSR activities 
and different kinds of chains could be useful. Some academics have begun adopting multi-
country perspectives in their studies of franchising issues (Azevedo and Silva 2007; Dant et 
al. 2008; Dunning et al. 2007; Perrigot et al. forthcoming). Such previous comparisons have 
highlighted significant differences in the strategies developed by American  and French 
franchisors. In particular, Dant et al. (2008) indicated that U.S. franchisors rely more heavily 
on franchising (9.45%  company-owned  units) than their French counterparts (36.17%). It 
would therefore be beneficial to examine their respective CSR practices along with a number 
of potential differences. 
Third, other variables may  be added to the linear regression models, although data 
availability represents a real constraint. Other variables could be tied to the franchisor or 
franchised chain as well as to the unit, as introduced by Kaufmann et al. (2008) for instance 
with investment for each unit and allowance of passive ownership. Also, the financial strength 
in franchise chains can lead to a higher percentage of company-owned  units, as the 
investments for opening new units become available, and along with it to expanded CSR 
activities. Consequently, the percentage of company-owned units could not causally predict 





                                                 
3 Thanks to one of the reviewers for raising this particular issue.   24 
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Variable  Variable description    N  Mean  Standard Deviation  C_SIZE  PCO_C  C_AGE  E_FEES 
C_SIZ 
Franchise chain size, including franchised units and 
company-owned units in the French market 
  126  141.09  131.907  1  0.164*  0.286***  -0.219** 
PCO_C 
Percentage of company-owned units within the chain 
in the French market 
  127  30.12  30.016    1  0.158*  -0.090 
C_AGE  Franchise chain age (in years)    135  18.91  15.618      1  -0.158* 
E_FEES  Average entry fees (in Euros)    122  21,480.25  13,922.183        1 
IND 
Industry in which the franchisor is doing business, 
distinguishing between the retail industry (coded 0) 
and the service industry (coded 1) 
 
136             
INT 
Franchise chain internationalization, distinguishing 
between purely domestic chains (coded 0) and 
international chains (coded 1) 
 
95             
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on variables related to the franchise chains 
Legend:*: Significant at 10%; **: at 5%; ***: at 1%   32 
CSR category  CSR subcategory  Examples of CSR information 
Environment  Pollution  Information on pollution control in business operations; company 
operations that are non-polluting or compliant with pollution laws and 
regulations; mitigation of pollution from operations; prevention or repair 
of damage to the environment resulting from process operations. 
Recycling  Information on conservation of natural resources; recycling of glass, 
metal, oil, water and paper; use of recycled materials; use of waste 
materials for energy production; energy savings resulting from product 
recycling. 
Resources/energy  Information on energy conservation in business operations; more 
efficient energy use during the manufacturing process; company efforts 
to reduce energy consumption; increased energy efficiency of products; 
research conducted specifically aimed at improving energy efficiency of 
products; awards received for energy conservation program, company's 
energy policies. 
Site aesthetics  Information on facility design in accordance with the environment; 
contributions in terms of cash or art/sculptures dedicated to 
environmental beautification; restoration of historical buildings. 
Certification/labels  Information on certifications and labels. 
Other  Information on contributions to wildlife conservation, environmental 




Health and safety  Information on the reduction or elimination of pollutants, irritants or 
hazards in the workplace; promotion of employee safety and physical or 
mental health; accident statistics; research conducted on improving 
worker safety; existence of a low-cost health care plan for employees; 
improvement of general working conditions. 
Training  Information on the establishment of trainee centers; training of 
employees through in-house programs; financial assistance to employees 
enrolled in educational institutions or continuing education courses. 
Compensation  Information on the amounts of money spent for compensation, 
superannuation; any policies/objectives/reasons in favor of the company's 
compensation package/schemes. 
Industrial relations  Information on the company's relationships with trade unions and/or 
workers' organizations; occurrence of strikes, internal conflicts. 
Other  Information on any company reorganization that affects staff, closure of 
any company branch / unit and resultant layoffs; any company efforts to 
relocate / retrain; statistics on employee turnover. 
Products  Research and 
development 
Information on developments related to the company's products; amount 
of research and development expenditures; any research projects 
launched by the company aimed at product improvement. 
Quality  Information on company product quality, as reflected in prizes/awards 
received. 
Safety  Information regarding the fact that products meet applicable safety 
standards, are being made safer for consumers; information regarding 
safety research conducted on the company's products; improved or more 
sanitary procedures adopted in the processing and preparation of 
products; information regarding company product safety. 
Other  Other social information relative to Products. 
Fair business 
practices 
Suppliers  Information on business relationships with local suppliers. 
Franchisees  Information on business relationships with franchisees. 




The arts  Information on donating cash, products or employee services to 
sponsoring of the arts; art exhibits. 
Education  Information on donating cash, products or employee services to 




Information on sponsoring public health projects, aiding medical 
research, supporting the development of local industries or community 
programs and activities; summer internships or part-time employment of 
students; support of nationally sponsored campaigns. 
Other  Other social information relative to community involvement. 
Ethics    Information on the company's policy regarding business ethics. 
Other    Other social information. 
 
Table 2: Description of CSR categories and subcategories 
(source: Hackston and Milne, 1996)   34 
 
Category of CSR 
activities 
Subcategories of CSR activities  Present (not present) on the 
franchisor's website 
CSR  AGGREGATE (all categories combined)  117 (19) 
Environment  AGGREGATE (all subcategories combined)  60 (76) 
Pollution  25 (111) 
Recycling  33 (103) 
Resources / energy  26 (110) 
Site aesthetics  8 (128) 
Certification / labels  18 (118) 
Other  52 (84) 
Human resources  AGGREGATE (all subcategories combined)  64 (72) 
Health and safety  10 (126) 
Training  60 (76) 
Compensation  8 (128) 
Industrial relationships  4 (132) 
Other  33 (103) 
Products  AGGREGATE (all subcategories combined)  108 (28) 
Research and development  44 (92) 
Quality  105 (31) 
Safety  27 (109) 
Other  4 (132) 
Fair business practices  AGGREGATE (all subcategories combined)  24 (112) 
Suppliers  7 (129) 
Franchisees  8 (128) 
Other  12 (124) 
Community involvement  AGGREGATE (all subcategories combined)  41 (95) 
The arts  6 (130) 
Education  4 (132) 
Humanitarianism / health  34 (102) 
Other  12 (124) 
Ethics  AGGREGATE  4 (132) 
Other  AGGREGATE  4 (132) 
 
Table 3: Presence or not of a CSD on franchisors' websites 
Legend: Frequencies are reported as present (not present) 
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Variable category  Variable  Analysis  C_SIZ  PCO_C  C_AGE  E_FEES 
CSR  AGGREGATE  P. Cor.  0.405***  0.176**  0.236***  -0.009 
N  126  127  135  122 
Environment  AGGREGATE  P. Cor.  0.368***  0.092  0.198**  -0.048 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Pollution  P. Cor.  0.346***  0.117  0.220**  -0.064 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Recycling  P. Cor.  0.386***  0.037  0.148*  0.031 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Resources / energy  P. Cor.  0.230***  0.058  0.102  0.12 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Site aesthetics  P. Cor.  0.298***  0.144  0.115  0.014 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Certification / labels  P. Cor.  0.177**  0.073  0.155*  -0.077 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Other  P. Cor.  0.401***  0.098  0.216**  -0.145 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Human resources  AGGREGATE  P. Cor.  0.216**  0.227**  -0.036  0.078 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Health and safety  P. Cor.  -0.085  0.147*  -0.119  -0.043 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Training  P. Cor.  0.278***  0.144  -0.073  0.101 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Compensation  P. Cor.  -0.07  0.202**  -0.059  0.051 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Industrial relationships  P. Cor.  0.053  0.189**  -0.012  0.109 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Other  P. Cor.  0.240***  0.210**  0.057  0.068 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Products  AGGREGATE  P. Cor.  0.293***  0.199**  0.164*  -0.025 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Research and development  P. Cor.  0.243***  0.132  0.154*  -0.177* 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Quality  P. Cor.  0.186**  0.146  0.15*  0.004 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Safety  P. Cor.  0.348***  0.243***  0.036  0.143 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Other  P. Cor.  0.198**  0.013  0.075  0.07 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Fair business 
practices 
AGGREGATE  P. Cor.  0.126  -0.144  -0.01  0.029 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Suppliers  P. Cor.  0.091  -0.042  0.083  0.123 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Franchisees  P. Cor.  -0.049  -0.124  -0.019  0.011 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Other  P. Cor.  0.124  -0.112  -0.024  0.003 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Community 
involvement 
AGGREGATE  P. Cor.  0.294***  0.158*  0.458***  0.038 
  N  126  127  135  122 
The arts  P. Cor.  0.208**  0.169*  0.233***  -0.1 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Education  P. Cor.  0.234***  0.016  -0.009  0.017 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Humanitarianism / health  P. Cor.  0.217**  0.133  0.429***  0.093 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Other  P. Cor.  0.323***  0.132  0.387***  -0.079 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Ethics  AGGREGATE  P. Cor.  0.235***  0.104  0.131  -0.123 
  N  126  127  135  122 
Other  AGGREGATE  P. Cor.  0.132  -0.051  0.015  -0.005 
  N  126  127  135  122 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
(CSR and CSR categories with franchise chain characteristics) 
Legend: P. Cor.: Pearson correlation values; *: Significant at 10%; **: at 5%; ***: at 1% 
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Variable 













CSR  AGGREGATE  21.40  16.44  25.67  8.69***  28.03*** 
Environment 
AGGREGATE  7.65  4.52  10.36  2.17***  11.20*** 
Pollution  0.94  0.52  1.30  0.17**  1.22** 
Recycling  1.09  0.46**  1.63**  0.17***  1.78*** 
Resources / 
energy  1.91  0.56**  3.08**  0.94  2.79 
Site aesthetics  0.18  0.10  0.26  0.00**  0.33** 
Certification / 
labels  0.64  0.40  0.85  0.43  0.84 
Other  2.89  2.49  3.23  0.46***  4.24*** 
Human 
resources 
AGGREGATE  3.44  2.49  4.26  1.34***  4.45*** 
Health and 
safety  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.09  0.46 
Training  1.87  1.16**  2.48**  0.97**  2.14** 
Compensation  0.14  0.19  0.10  0.06  0.22 
Industrial 
relationships  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.00*  0.11* 
Other  1.07  0.79  1.32  0.23**  1.51** 
Products 
AGGREGATE  7.68  7.05  8.22  4.71**  8.63** 
R&D  1.16  1.49  0.88  0.43**  1.59** 
Quality  5.68  5.25  6.04  3.91  6.03 
Safety  0.80  0.27**  1.26**  0.31*  0.97* 
Other  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.04 
Fair business 
practices 
AGGREGATE  0.50  0.27  0.70  0.43  0.30 
Suppliers  0.08  0.03  0.12  0.00**  0.12** 
Franchisees  0.10  0.17*  0.04*  0.23  0.04 
Other  0.32  0.06  0.53  0.20  0.14 
Community 
involvement 
AGGREGATE  1.99  1.87  2.08  0.11***  3.20*** 
The arts  0.11  0.19  0.04  0.00  0.18 
Education  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.00  0.09 
Humanitarianism 
/ health  1.46  1.11  1.77  0.11***  2.33*** 
Other  0.35  0.51  0.21  0.00**  0.59** 
Ethics  AGGREGATE  0.11  0.19  0.04  0.00  0.16 
Other  AGGREGATE  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.00*  0.09* 
 
Table 5: CSR and CSR categories with Industry and Internationalization 






















Table 6: Results of the linear regression model 
(Y = extent of franchisor CSR activity communication on its website) 
Legend:*: Significant at 10%; **: at 5%; ***: at 1%; and Ln indicates use of the natural logarithm. 
 
  Model 
Ln CSR 
 
  B  S.E.  β   
C_SIZ  0.004***  0.001  0.356***   
PCO_C  0.010**  0.004  0.243**   
C_AGE  0.000  0.009  -0.002   
E_FEES  0.000  0.000  0.109   
IND  0.394  0.324  0.144   
INT  0.310  0.332  0.104   
Constant  0.770  0.424     
R  0.508   
R²  0.258   
R² Adjusted  0.199   





















Table 7: Results of the linear regression models 
(Y = extent of franchisor communication relative to each particular category of CSR activities on its website) 
Legend:*: Significant at 10%; **: at 5%; ***: at 1% 
  Model 1 
Ln Environment 
Model 2 









  B  S.E.  β  B  S.E.  β  B  S.E.  β  B  S.E.  β  B  S.E.  β 
C_SIZ  .003  .002  .308  .001  .001  .079  .002  .001  .268*  .003  .002  .928*  .003  .002  .418* 
PCO_C  .009  .006  .237  .005  .005  .153  .007  .004  .209*  -.009  .010  -.353  .007  .008  .209 
C_AGE  -.007  .012  -.102  .005  .010  .085  -.004  .008  -.067  -.013  .027  -.208  .010  .011  .197 
E_FEES  .000  .000  .135  .000  .000  -.142  .000  .000  .086  .000  .000  .274  .000  .000  .274 
IND  .112  .513  .041  .283  .446  .129  .177  .305  .081  -.534  .677  -.447  -.275  .654  -.119 
INT  .242  .555  .077  .592  .409  .257  -.078  .306  -.032  -.454  .438  -.355  .481  .818  .114 
Constant  .560  .641    .730  .520    1.073
***  .397    .669  .578    -.547  .967   
R  0.433  0.430  0.345  0.651  0.569 
R²  0.187  0.185  0.119  0.424  0.323 
R² 
Adjusted 
0.052  0.049  0.039  0.040  0.110 
Anova  1.384  1.361  1.488  1.104  1.514   39 
 
 